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Depositions for Discovery:
The New Virginia Rule
J.

WESTWOOD SMITHES

Important amendments to its Rules, effective April 1, 1961,
were recently adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia. Perhaps the change of most interest to trial lawyers was the revision of Rule 3:23 relating to D'epositions and
Discovery in Actions at Law.
The Background
Prior to 1954 there was disagreement as to whether or not
depositions for discovery could be taken incident to an action
at law in a Virginia court. The promulgation in 1938 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permitted the taking
of oral depositions of parties and witnesses for pretrial discovery, had created intense interest in the availability of this
device in our state courts.
It was contended by some that the set of statutes found in
Virginia Code §8-320 through §8-236, providing for interrogatories to (and production of books, etc., by) an adverse
party or claimant, comprised all the Virginia law on the
subject of pretrial discovery, aside from the ancient bill for
discovery in chancery which had been expressly saved by
Code §8-327. According to this argument, the deposition
statutes found in Code §8-304 et seq. were not to be interpreted as encompassing depositions taken for the purpose of
pretrial discovery.
On April 23, 1953, the opposite view was ably propounded by
Judge Ralph T. Catterall, of the State Corporation Commission, in an address before the Judicial Conference of Virginia
in Richmond. At that time he said:
My own view is that the remedies are cumulative and
that a lawyer who wants to get his hands on his oppo-
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nent's evidence before trial has three choices. He can
file a bill in equity for discovery in the good old 18th Century manner, or he can use the discovery statutes [Va.
Code Ann. §8-320 et seq.], which, in the 19th Century,
conferred on the law courts concurrent jurisdiction to
grant the relief that only the chancellor could previously
allow, or he can take depositions.
In 1954 the Supreme Court of Appeals adopted Rule 3:23
which in paragraph (c) provided for the taking of depositions
for discovery. The rule made it permissive, not mandatory,
for a court in an action at law to permit the taking of a
deposition for discovery (limited to subjects named in the
court's order) and then only "if satisfied ... that the moving

party should have access to evidence or information subject
to the control of the adverse party or of a third person."
(Paragraph (b) made an exception as to an adverse party's
expert witness.)
At the same time, paragraph (a) of the 1954 rule provided:
A party may object to the taking of a deposition wader

§8-304 or §8-305 of the Code of Virginia by moving the

court promptly after receiving notice of the taking of the
depositions, to quash the notice; and the court shall
quash the notice unless satisfied that the taking of the
deposition is in good faith for the purpose of taking and
introducing the testimony of a witness who nay not be
able to attend the trial of the case. (Emphasis added.)
Experience under this 1954 version of Rule 3:23 demonstrated that some of the trial courts in Virginia rarely,
if ever, permitted the taking of depositions for discovery.
In the first place it may be conjectured that a judge who
was not in sympathy with pretrial discovery practice might
well have found it difficult to become "satisfied" that one
party to a lawsuit "should have access" to his opponent's
evidence before trial. Furthermore, some of the trial judges
interpreted paragraph (a) of the rule as qualifying and
limiting paragraph (c), and hence would refuse to permit
the taking of a deposition for discovery unless the moving
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party could show that the witness might "not be able to
attend the trial of the case."
This confusion was, perhaps, inherent in Rule 3:23 as
originally worded. For the reference in paragraph (a) to
the taking of "a deposition under §8-304: or §8-305 of the
Code of Virginia" was so broad as literally to include the
taking of a deposition for discovery, although it is most
unlikely that this was the intent of the framers of the rule.
(This conjecture may be considered substantiated in some
degree by the recent change in the wording of the rule by
the Supreme Court of Appeals.)
The core of this difficulty may lie in the confusion of
depositions de bene esse with depositions for discovery. The
device of taking depositions of witnesses has evolved in our
law for several distinct purposes. One of them is to obtain
before trial the testimony of a witness who probably will not
be available to testify ore tenus at the trial. Such a deposition, taken to be read at the trial if the witness should be
absent, is taken de bene esse, i.e., conditionally or provisionally. A deposition for discovery, on the other hand, is taken
not because of the likelihood that the witness will be unable
to attend the trial, but because the party taking the deposition
seeks to obtain information in advance of the trial which will
be helpful to him in preparing and presenting his case, ineluding fore-knowledge of the very testimony that the witness
is expected to give at the trial. With this distinction in mind
it is obvious that whether or not the witness may be able to
attend the trial of the case is entirely immaterial when his
deposition is taken for the purpose of discovery.
The 1961 Amendment
In its amendment of Rule 3:23, adopted January 17, 1961,
and effective April 1, 1961, the Supreme Court of Appeals
made this distinction clear. Paragraph (a) no longer refers
to "a deposition under §8-304: or §8-305 of the Code of Virginia" (which would literally include depositions for discovery), but now refers to "a. deposition de bene esse." It is,
therefore, only when a deposition is sought because of the
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likelihood that the witness will not be available to testify at
the trial that the trial court, upon motion of the objecting

party, shall quash the notice unless satisfied that the witness
"may not be able to attend the trial of the case." It now
seems abundantly clear that paragraph (a) does not qualify
or limit paragraph (c), and that the ability or inability of
the witness to be present at the trial has no bearing whatsoever on a court's decision upon a motion to permit the taking
of a deposition for discovery.
Further, the newly-effective amendment makes a most significant change with respect to a party's right to take depositions for discovery. Whereas the original rule was permissive, only, and even then conditioned upon the court's being
satisfied that the moving party "should have access to evidence or other information subject to the control of the
adverse party or of a third person," the amended rule is mandatory in providing that
the court, if satisfied... that the moving party in good
faith desires access by way of discovery to evidence, the
names and addresses of witnesses, or other information
subject to the control of the adverse party or of a third
person, shall permit the taking of a deposition for discovery, and shall enter an order requiring the adverse
party or such third person . . . to answer questions
relevant to subjects named in the order. ... (Emphasis

added.)
Except for the requirement of a bona fide desire to get his
hands on his opponent's evidence before trial, the only express
limitation on a party's right to take a discovery deposition
(of one not an expert witness employed-by the other party)
is found in this new, concluding sentence of paragraph (c):
The court shall deny the motion if it finds that granting
the motion would unreasonably delay the case or impose
unreasonable hardship or expense on the adverse party.
It is believed that the 1961 revision of Rule 3:23 should go
far toward making the practice of pretrial discover-y by
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deposition a reality in Virginia courts. That there are disadvantages in such a practice cannot be denied. But it is
believed that on balance the. result will be to further the
administration of justice by making litigation less of a game
to be played with "aces in the hole" and more of a search for
the facts and a determination of the truth. In thus liberalizing its discovery procedure, Virginia is to a degree emulating the discovery devices of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which "have achieved wider acceptance in state
practice than ony other federal civil rules." Developments
in the Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940 (Mar. 1961).
For the convenience of the reader, Rule 3:23 is set out
below with the matter stricken out by the 1961 amendment
enclosed in brackets; new matter is printed in italics.
Rule 3:23. Depositions [under Code Sections 8-304
and 8-305] and Discovery in Actions at Law
(a) A party may 'object to the taking of a deposition
[under § 8-304 or § 8-305 of the Code of Virginia] de-bene esse
by moving the court, promptly after receiving notice of the
taking of the. deposition, to quash the notice; and the court
shall quash the notice unless satisfied that the taking of the
deposition is in good faith for the purpose of taking and
introducing the testimony of a witness who may not be able
to attend the trial of the case.
(b) The deposition of a witness whose first connection with
the case was his employment to give. his opinion as an
expert may be taken only at the instance of the party who
employed him.
(c) On motion of any party, the court, if satisfied by affidavit, testimony, inspection of the pleadings or otherwise that
the moving party [should have] in good faith desires access
by way of discovery to evidence, the names and addresses of
witnesses, or other information subject to the control of the
adverse party or of a third person, [may] shall permit the
taking of a deposition for discovery and [may] shall enter
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an order requiring the adverse party or such third person to
attend at a time and place and before a notary or commissioner named in the order and answer questions relevant to
subjects named in the order and to make available for inspection, copying or photographing any writing, chattel or real
property described in the order. The court shall deny the
motion if it finds that grantingthe motion would unreasonably
delay the case or impose unreasonablehardship or expense on
the adverse party.
(d) If the pleadings raise an issue as to the mental or
physical condition of a party the court, on motion of an adverse party, may order the party to submit to an examination
by one or more physicians named in the order and employed
by the moving party. A written report of the examination
shall be made by the physicians to the court and filed with
the clerk before the trial and a copy furnished to each party.
The court may in the order fix the time and place for the
examination and the, time for filing the report and furnishing
the copies. The written report shall not be admitted in evidence unless offered by the party who submitted to the
examination.

